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COMMENTS
TITLE VII, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT AND THE
FRIENDSHIP COMMERCE AND
NAVIGATION TREATY - AN ONGOING
CONFLICT: AN ANALYSIS OF
MacNAMARA v. KOREAN AIR LINES
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the many attempts to guarantee all men and women
equal treatment under the law, nothing has given greater impe-
tus to shattering the bonds of discrimination in employment
than the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII).' Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex or national origin."2 In addition to Ti-
tle VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967'
(ADEA) filled the gap left by Title VII in antidiscrimination leg-
islation. The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination based
on an individual's age.4
Although these statutes have effectively deterred employ-
ment discrimination within the United States, the expansion of
international trade and the concurrent proliferation of multina-
tional corporations employing United States workers have cre-
ated many new issues and conflicts with regard to the applica-
tion of these statutes to foreign corporations. Among these
issues is the application of Title VII and the ADEA to foreign
and United States corporations employing United States citizens
abroad, and to foreign corporations doing business within the
United States. These issues are further complicated by interna-
l. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1990).
2. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1990).
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621-34
(1990).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1990).
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tional treaties and trade agreements, such as the Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty (FCN Treaty) between the
United States and the Republic of Korea.5 The treaty, which
contains a clause allowing Korean corporations the right to "en-
gage . . . executive personnel. . . of their choice,"' seems to be
in direct conflict with both Title VII and the ADEA, thus posing
a severe threat to the application and protection otherwise af-
forded by these antidiscrimination statutes.
The FCN Treaty seems to conflict with the antidiscrimina-
tion statutes' prohibition against discrimination in employment
by allowing foreign corporations the absolute right to hire em-
ployees of their choice.7 Since similar treaties exist with many
other foreign nations,8 and as a result of the vast influx of for-
eign investors and corporations into the United States today,
this conflict is arising more often. Although three other United
States Courts of Appeal have faced this issue,9 the Third Cir-
5. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, November 7, 1957, the United
States - Republic of Korea, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947 [hereinafter FCN Treaty].
6. FCN Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII(l).
7. FCN Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII(l).
8. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, November 4, 1946,
United States - China, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, October 29, 1954, United States - Federal Republic of Germany,
7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Au-
gust 3, 1951, United States - Greece, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, August 23, 1951, United States - Israel, 5 U.S.T. 550,
T.I.A.S. No. 551; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, February 2, 1948,
United States - Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, April 2, 1953, United States - Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, March 27, 1956, United States - The
Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; and Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, November 12, 1959, United States - Pakistan, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No.
4683.
9. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), va-
cated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). In that case, secretaries brought a class
action against a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, alleging that the
corporation had a discriminatory policy of filing its management-level positions exclu-
sively with male Japanese nationals. The Second Circuit held that the FCN between the
United States and Japan, containing a clause identical to article VIII(l) of the FCN
Treaty, did not exempt a Japanese company from Title VII coverage. The court used the
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification exception, see infra note 64, as a tool for eliminat-
ing the conflict between the statute and Title VII; Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),
Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982) (hold-
ing that the Treaty provisions totally shielded the company from the domestic antidis-
crimination statutes); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a similar clause in the Greek FCN Treaty provided only a restricted exemption to
give preference to Greek citizens).
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cuit's decision in MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines10 addressed
this dilemma in a more direct manner and also discussed and
compared its analysis with the various Circuit Court decisions
which preceded this case. The court in MacNamara reconciled
Title VII, the ADEA and the FCN Treaty and held that al-
though a Korean company would be permitted to hire a Korean
citizen over a United States citizen, the "of their choice" lan-
guage contained in the Treaty did not excuse foreign employers
from the reach of the United States antidiscrimination statutes,
which prohibit intentional discrimination based on race, religion,
sex, national origin and age.11
This Comment examines the conflict between the United
States statutes and the FCN Treaty, and proposes some possible
resolutions. It begins with a brief history of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the FCN Treaty. Against this background,
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines is discussed in an attempt to
reconcile previous decisions with domestic and international law
and policy. Finally this Comment concludes by suggesting that
guidelines be implemented to ensure that statutes are not en-
acted when the proposed statute would create a conflict with an
existing international obligation. Congress should be required to
amend existing international agreements if they conflict with
proposed statutes prior to the enactment of such statutes. Fur-
thermore, in light of the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the
appeal in the MacNamara case, Congress should clarify its in-
tent and amend conflicting statutes or international obligations
whenever possible.
II. TITLE VII, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
AND THE FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION TREATY
The Civil Rights Act of 196412 was the product of many
prior attempts to enact an all-encompassing antidiscrimination
statute. On February 28, 1963, President John F. Kennedy
stated in a message to Congress that Title VII espoused the
principle that "no man should be denied employment commen-
surate with his abilities because of his race or creed or ances-
try."' 3 In addition to President Kennedy's support, many groups
10. 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988).
11. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1136.
12. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1990).
13. 109 CONG. REC. 3248 (1963); see also Comment, Japanese Employers and Title
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such as the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People demanded federal legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination in the workplace. 14 Congress responded to this pres-
sure by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, aimed at guaran-
teeing all persons equal protection from employment related
discrimination. 15 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibits employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."'" While the primary objective at
the time of the enactment of Title VII was to eliminate discrimi-
nation against blacks, the Supreme Court has noted that "[tihe
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII ... was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barri-
ers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of. . . employees over other employees.' 7 The language of Title
VII does not explicitly exempt foreign corporations employing
United States citizens either inside or outside of the United
States."
As a result of Title VII's failure to include age-related dis-
crimination, the ADEA' s was enacted as an attempt by Congress
to fill the void left by Title VII. The ADEA prohibits age-related
employment discrimination against persons age forty and over.20
VII: Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. POL. 653, 666
(1983) [hereinafter Japanese Employers and Title VII].
14. Japanese Employers and Title VII, supra note 13, at 667.
15. See infra note 16.
16. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1990). The text of Title VII states in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 427, 429-30 (1971).
18. Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Employ-
ers in the United States and Abroad, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. Pot. 357 (1987).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c)(1) (1986).
The text of the ADEA states in pertinent part that:
It shall be unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
[Vol. XVII'2
MacNAMARA v. KOREAN AIR LINES
The ADEA covers private employers of twenty or more workers
and all federal agencies. It states that its purpose is "to promote
employment of older workers based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment. 21 The general
application and terms of the statute are similar to those in Title
VII.22 The statute provides that "if an employer controls a cor-
poration whose place of incorporation is in a foreign country,
any practice by such corporation prohibited under this section
shall be presumed to be such practice by such employer. '23
Therefore, a United States corporation operating in a foreign
country would be covered by the statute. However, there is no
mention of coverage of foreign corporations that operate in the
United States.
The FCN Treaty24 between the United States and the Re-
public of Korea was intended to promote and secure foreign in-
vestment.25 The purpose of the Treaty was to increase foreign
investment and allay the fears of such investors concerning their
ability to control their companies without interference. 6 The
Treaty permits nationals of either party to enter the territories
of the other party to carry on trade and engage in other activity
related to their investments. The Treaty further grants the
right of a national of either party to travel freely within the ter-
ritory of the other party and guarantees such parties fair treat-
ment and safety.28 Additionally, the property of the nationals of
chapter.
Id. at § 623.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1990).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1990).
24. FCN Treaty, supra note 5. The Treaty, in Article VIII(l), states in pertinent
part that:
1. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical ex-
perts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their
choice.
Id. at art. VIII(l) (emphasis added).
25. Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 AMER. J. CoMp. L. 229, 230 (1956) [hereinafter
Walker, Treaties].
26. Walker, Treaties, supra note 25, at 30.
27. FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
28. FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
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a party to the Treaty will be protected. "
The legislative history of the FCN Treaty seems to suggest
that both parties felt that the right of employers to hire their
own nationals in high-level positions was vital to the success of
foreign investment.3 0 Thus, a clause was included in the Treaty
that permits Korean corporations to engage executive personnel
"of their choice."'1 This clause appears on its face to condone
discriminatory practices in the selection of employees, in direct
conflict with the anti-discriminatory thrust of Title VII and the
ADEA.3 2 Although the FCN Treaty seems to allow an absolute
right to Korean companies to engage employees of their choice,
whether such choice is premised on a discriminatory basis or
not,3 3 the antidiscrimination statutes generally prohibit any dis-
criminatory practices in the workplace. 4
III. MACNAMARA V. KOREAN AIR LINES
A. Background
Thomas MacNamara, a fifty-seven-year-old caucasian
United States citizen, began working for Korean Air Lines
(KAL), a Korean corporation, in 1974. His employment was ter-
minated on June 15, 1982.2 While employed by KAL, he had
been promoted from salesman to district sales manager for Dela-
ware, Pennsylvania, and southern New Jersey. 6 As a result of a
KAL restructuring program, MacNamara was fired and replaced
by Wan Gin Chung, a forty-two-year-old Korean citizen.31
After exhausting his administrative remedies, MacNamara
brought an action against KAL, alleging inter alia,38 violations
29. FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
30. The legislative history is similar for other Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion treaties with other nations as well. See Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm.
on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation Between the United States and Columbia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and
Greece, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1952). See also Wickes v. Olympic Airlines, 745 F.2d 363,
367-68 (6th Cir. 1984).
31. FCN Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII(1).
32. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
33. The FCN Treaty seems to grant a broad right to hire employees of the foreign
employer's choice, regardless of the intent of such acts. See FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
34. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
35. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988).
36. Id.
37. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
38. MacNamara also alleged that as a result of his termination, he was deprived of
[Vol. XVII:2
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of both Title VII and the ADEA. MacNamara's complaint
claimed that the decision to replace him was based primarily on
his national origin and age, in violation of both Title VII and
ADEA.3 The complaint stated that "all of [KAL's] American
Sales Managers in the United States were replaced by Kore-
ans.140 MacNamara further alleged that when enacting Title VII
and the ADEA, Congress impliedly repealed the Treaty exemp-
tion and, therefore, KAL is bound by Title VII and the ADEA.41
In a motion to dismiss, KAL claimed that under the terms of
Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty, a Korean Corporation is per-
mitted to "engage ... executive personnel ... of their
choice," 2 and thus, it was exempt from the prohibitions of Title
VII and the ADEA.43
B. District Court Decision
The district court, ruling on KAL's motion to dismiss,
granted summary judgment in favor of KAL and held that there
was a direct conflict between the United States statutes, Title
VII and the ADEA, and Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty."
The court held that based on the history and construction of the
FCN Treaty, there was no clear showing of congressional intent
to override the Treaty.45 Since the court found no intent and
since a.valid reconciliation between Title VII and the ADEA and
the Treaty was not possible, the court concluded that the Treaty
must take precedence over Title VII.46
The district court discussed the history of the FCN Treaty
benefits due to him under the Korean Air Lines pension plan, and that such deprivation
violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1) (1982). As such, MacNamara went to the various governmental agencies and
filed a complaint prior to instituting this action. This type of action generally requires
that the injured party exhaust all administrative remedies prior to the filing of an action.
MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1138.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. MacNamara, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 384. MacNamara also argued
that he was not an "executive" under the terms of the Treaty.- In the alternative, he
argued that the term "engage," used in the Treaty, does not encompass the right to
terminate an executive employee. Id.
42. Id. at 384 (citing the FCN Treaty, supra note 5).
43. Id. at 391.
44. Id. at 385.
45. Id.
46. The court stated that to hold that Title VII superceded the Treaty would "go
beyond the judicial sphere of interpretation." Id. at 391.
1991]
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and the specific nature of such treaties in an attempt to analyze
the intent of the parties and reconcile the Treaty with the an-
tidiscrimination statutes.47 The court noted that the statutes
may only prevent the assertion of the "of their choice" excep-
tion48 if-there was a showing of intent on the part of the United
States Congress to override the Treaty by the passage of the
statutes.49
The district court then analyzed the FCN Treaty's various
standards of treatment of foreign corporations. ° The court in-
terpreted Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty as an "absolute"
rule, which grants greater rights to foreign companies than those
51afforded to domestic companies.
The district court then explained that its role in interpret-
ing treaties was to "giv[e] effect to the intent of the treaty par-
ties."52 Only when Congress clearly intends to depart from the
United States Treaty obligation may the court find such a de-
parture5 The court found no such intent and held that Title
VII did not override the FCN Treaty.54 Based on the general
FCN Treaty history, the court inferred from the "of their
choice" language of Article VIII(1) 55 that the intent of the
United States and the Republic of Korea was to exempt from
47. Id. at 385-86.
48. FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
49. MacNamara, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 386. The court stated that ab-
sent a clear intention by Congress to override the treaty obligations, the court must at-
tempt to reconcile the statute and the treaty. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the
FCN Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea was one of many such
treaties adopted by Congress after World War II. Contrary to pre-FCN Treaty agree-
ments, which merely gave legal status to corporations operating in a foreign country and
access to foreign courts, the FCN Treaties were intended to allow United States corpora-
tions to conduct business in other countries and allow foreign corporations to conduct
business within the United States. The court also noted that these treaties were not
political in nature, but rather, they were fundamentally economic and legal in nature. Id.
at 385-86.
50. Id. These standards of treatment are: (1) "national treatment," which affords
foreign corporations the same treatment as domestic corporations; (2) "most favored na-
tion treatment," which means that a foreign company in the host country is afforded the
same treatment as a company of any third country in similar circumstances; and (3)
"absolute" rules in treaties, which grant foreign companies greater rights and freedoms
than those afforded to domestic companies. Id.
51. Id. at 386-87.
52. Id. at 386. (Quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigiano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 387.
55. Id. (citing FCN Treaty, supra note 5).
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the impact of the host countries' domestic laws, those employees
who are directly involved with policy-making, those charged
with the administration of such policy, and those with essential
technical skills.56
The court noted that in other FCN treaties, the United
States had insisted on language that either limited the "of their
choice" exception or made it conditional on other factors.5
Thus, it is apparent that Congress had no such intent regarding
this Treaty as a result of the United States' inclusion of such
provisions in similar treaties and the clear absence of such lan-
guage here.58 Therefore, the court concluded that the Treaty is
"clear on its face '59 and no such intent is present in this case.60
In a further attempt to reconcile the Treaty with Title VII
and the ADEA, the court confronted MacNamara's argument
that he was not an "executive employee" under the terms of the
Treaty. Since the Treaty states that foreign corporations may
hire "executive employees of their choice," if MacNamara was
not an executive employee, the Treaty would fail to protect KAL
from the restrictions of Title VII and the ADEA.6 1 However, the
district court had very little difficulty in finding that
MacNamara was in fact an "executive employee" under the
terms of the exception clause of Article VIII(l).62 Thus, as an
executive employee under the terms of the treaty exemption,
KAL could replace him with an "executive employee of [its]
choice."6 3
The court rejected the theory that the Bona Fide Occupa-
tional Qualification (BFOQ) exception of Title VII was a valid
tool for such a reconciliation of the Treaty with the statute. 4
56. Id.
57. Id. The court cited as examples a similar treaty between the United States and
Uruguay, in which the United States negotiated language in the treaty to deal with do-
mestic law restrictions, and a treaty with Pakistan, which included the clause
"[niationals and companies of either party shall be permitted, in accordance with the
applicable laws . Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 388-89. The court reasoned that MacNamara's position as the district
sales manager was of great importance and included supervisory and managerial respon-
sibilities. Id.
63. Id. at 389-90.
64. Id. at 391. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification exception (BFOQ) to Title
VII states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not be an unlaw-
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
The BFOQ exception exempts employees with specific qualifica-
tions needed to perform a particular job from Title VII protec-
tion. It allows employers to hire such persons if they meet the
requirements of the BFOQ exception. 5 The court stated that
the application of the BFOQ exception "would require a court or
jury to resolve broad issues beyond those that Congress intended
to place before the courts." 6 Thus, the court concluded that the
application of the BFOQ exception with regard to the "of their
choice" exemption would expand the narrow scope of the BFOQ
exception intended by Congress and could not be applied here.67
Following the district court's decision granting summary
judgment, MacNamara appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
C. Court of Appeals Decision
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision
and held that a reconciliation of Title VII, the ADEA and the
FCN Treaty was possible and additionally that the "of their
choice" language contained in the Treaty did not excuse foreign
employers from the reach of the United States antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, which prohibit intentional discrimination based on
race, religion, sex, national origin and age.6 8 Consistent with its
holding, the court remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings and a determination as to whether KAL had
intentionally discriminated based on race, national origin or age,
rather than based on citizenship alone.6 9 The court of appeals
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an
employment agency to classify, or refer its membership or to classify or refer
for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program,
on the basis of his religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
65. Id.
66. MacVamara, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 391.
67. Id.
68. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1147 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion. The court held that MacNamara's claim was valid and should not have been
disposed of summarily. Id. at 1149.
69. Id.
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noted that with respect to age discrimination, a foreign corpora-
tion could not, for example, intentionally set out to reduce the
average age of its work force.7 0 However, the court did perceive a
potential conflict between the FCN Treaty and Title VII regard-
ing an employer's hiring decision based solely on the employee's
citizenship, race or other basis prohibited by Title VII.71
The court then discussed the outcomes of similar cases in
other circuits in an attempt to display the varying analyses and
outcomes. The court distinguished a Fifth Circuit decision,
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),72 in which the Fifth Circuit
held that Title VII did not protect United States employees of a
wholly-owned New York subsidiary of a Japanese company from
discrimination by the employer .7  The Spiess court based its
opinion on a United States-Japanese FCN Treaty provision that
is nearly identical to Article VIII(l) of the United States-Korean
FCN Treaty.7 4 The court of appeals stated that the Spiess deci-
sion, which is consistent with the district court decision in
MacNamara, was incorrect and that the Fifth Circuit was the
only one of the three appellate courts to have considered this
issue to hold that a treaty totally insulates a foreign corporation
from domestic statutes.75
The court of appeals then addressed another similar case in
which the Second Circuit stated that the intent of a virtually
identical clause in a Japanese FCN Treaty was to broadly apply
the BFOQ exception. 6 In Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc.,77 the court held that based on the BFOQ excep-
tion, there was no conflict between Title VII and the FCN
Treaty. 8 Consequently, the Avigliano court merely required the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128, (1982)
(Spiess deals with United States employees of a wholly-owned New York subsidiary of a
Japanese company who claimed that their employer only gave promotions to Japanese
citizens).
73. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 353-72.
74. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 355.
75. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1139-40.
76. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
77. See Avigliano 638 F.2d 552. In this case, secretaries brought a class action
against a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, alleging that the corpora-
tion had a discriminatory policy of filing its management-level positions exclusively with
male Japanese nationals. Id. at 554.
78. Id. at 559.
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foreign company to justify its act under the BFOQ exception."
The Avigliano court, however, stated that the Treaty was not
intended to give foreign corporations greater rights than domes-
tic corporations."0 Like the Avigliano court, the MacNamara
court reasoned that the purpose of the Korean FCN Treaty was
not to grant greater rights to the foreign corporations, but rather
to protect foreign citizens from being discriminated against on
the basis of their nationality."1
The Third Circuit then noted the Sixth Circuit decision in
Wickes v. Olympic Airways8 2 which held that there was no con-
flict between Title VII and the FCN Treaty because the Treaty
permitted the hiring of Greek citizens and the statute did not
proscribe employment decisions on the basis of citizenship.
8 3
The Third Circuit agreed with the Wickes decision, stating that
Article VIII(1) of the FCN Treaty was targeted at domestic leg-
islation that discriminated on the basis of citizenship and that
the Treaty's purpose was to ensure that foreign investors would
not be barred from placing their own citizens in managerial
positions.8 4
The court of appeals in MacNamara also stated that it
agreed with KAL regarding MacNamara's "executive" status.
The court concluded that MacNamara was in fact an executive
employee under the treaty exception, due to his managerial role
and high-level status within the company. 5 The court disagreed
with KAL's argument that the term "to engage foreign nation-
als" included the right to replace persons such as MacNamara
with a foreigner.8 8 The court stated that KAL did not offer any
persuasive evidence that the purpose of the "of their choice"
clause was to permit an exemption from laws prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of race, national origin, or age discrimi-
nation.s The court noted that the holding of the district court
would create a reverse discrimination effect, thus granting for-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1146 (3d Cir. 1988).
82. 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
83. Wickes involved a corporation owned by the government of the Republic of
Greece that allegedly fired an employee in the United States based on his age and na-
tional origin. Id. at 363-64.
84. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1144-45.
85. Id. at 1141.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1145.
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eign corporations greater rights than those afforded to domestic
corporations.8 8
The court of appeals in MacNamara also relied on a United
States Department of State (State Department) interpretation
of the Treaty, noting that the Supreme Court case of Kolovrat v.
Oregon 9 held that such State Department interpretations must
be given great weight.9 0 According to the State Department, Ar-
ticle VIII(l) was intended to create a limited privilege to hire
noncitizens and was not intended to create a general exemption
from antidiscrimination laws.9 1
With regard to Congressional intent to override the treaty
provision, the court of appeals agreed with KAL's argument that
absent such intent, the Treaty must prevail in the face of a di-
rect conflict between Title VII and the FCN Treaty.9 2 The court
then stated that it did not perceive a conflict between the
Treaty and Title VII and the ADEA.93 In support of this asser-
tion, the court argued that Title VII and the ADEA deal with
intentional discrimination on the basis of race, national origin
and age, while the Treaty is intended to allow foreign corpora-
tions an opportunity to hire noncitizens. e4 The court also dis-
cussed the difference between the term "national" and the term
"citizen,"95 concluding that Title VII only prohibits discrimina-
tion based on nationality and not discrimination based on citi-
zenship.9 The court reasoned that exempting foreign corpora-
tions from Title VII would give the foreign corporations an
88. Id. The court of appeals did not interpret the treaty clause as being an absolute
standard of treatment as the district court did. See supra note 50.
89. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
90. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146. In Kolovrat, the Supreme Court stated that
while it is the court's function to interpret the treaties, great deference must be given to
the interpretations of the governmental departments charged with their negotiations and
enforcement. Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 194.
91. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1147. Citizens are defined as persons born or naturalized in the United
States who have "established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government
for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well
as their collective rights." United States v. Cruinkshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875). See
also, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "Nationality" is defined as that quality or character
which arises from the fact that a person belongs to a nation; nationality determines the
political status of the individual, especially with reference to allegiance. Brassert v. Bid-
dle, 59 F. Supp. 457, 462 (D. Conn. 1944).
96. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1140-41.
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unfair advantage over domestic corporations, which would re-
main bound by the statute. 7
The court saw no logical or theoretical conflict between the
Treaty, which allows a foreign corporation to hire its own citi-
zens as managers, and Title VII or the ADEA, which prohibit
intentional discrimination on a basis of race, age, and national
origin. Thus, in the absence of a conflict, the court concluded
that Title VII and the ADEA remain in full force and effect,
regardless of the FCN Treaty in this case and, therefore, KAL
may not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race, national
origin, or age.99
IV. APPROACHES TO THE CONFLICT: RECONCILIATION, DOMESTIC
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The issues raised by the MacNamara decision display the
intricate and frequently conflicting relationship between laws of
the United States and international law or United States bilat-
eral treaty law.100 Thus, there may be varying outcomes to the
conflict in MacNamara, depending on which body of law is
applied.
The general rule under both domestic and international law
is that, in the face of a conflict between a domestic statute and
an international agreement, the court should attempt to recon-
cile the United States statute with the international agree-
ment.101 However, if such a reconciliation is not possible, the
outcome of the conflict may differ under domestic and interna-
tional law. 0 2 Under domestic law, when a conflict arises between
an act of Congress and an international treaty, the later in time
will prevail.103 However, under international law, the United
States remains bound by the treaty or international agreement
and the subsequent statute does not relieve the United States
from its obligation. 10 4 Thus, under international law, the inter-
national agreement should prevail even if the statute was en-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1146.
100. Id. at 1135-49.
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 114 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
102. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 101, at § 115.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 101, at § 115.
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acted at a later date.
In the face of a conflict between a statute and an interna-
tional agreement, an attempt must be made to reconcile the
statute with the international agreement. The Supreme Court
has stated that under such circumstances "the court[s] will al-
ways endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if
that can be done without violating the language of either."105
This general principle dates back to the year 1804, when Chief
Justice John Marshall stated that "an Act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."106
If a reconciliation of the statute and the treaty is not possi-
ble, it is unclear which takes precedence. Under the Constitution
of the United States, Article VI, section 2, all laws of the United
States and all treaties made under the authority of the United
States are "the supreme law of the land.'10 7 Therefore, it seems
that there is nothing in the Constitution that gives one superior-
ity over the other. A treaty is the law of the land, as is a statute
passed by Congress. 08 Thus, an ambiguity remains as to which
takes priority in the face of a clear conflict between these forces
of law.
The general rule of domestic law is that in the face of a
clear conflict between a treaty and a subsequent statute, the
subsequent statute take precedence over the treaty. 09 This ex-
105. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1988). This case dealt with a conflict
between a statute and treaty regarding the imposition of an import tax. The court held
that when a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts
for want of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty. See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 101, at § 114, which states: "Where fairly possible, a United States
statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an interna-
tional agreement of the United States." Id.
106. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
Also cited by RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 101, at § 114, reporter's notes.
107. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI (em-
phasis added).
108. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598, 599 (1884). See also Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). ("[Both treaties and statutes] are declared to be
the supreme law of the land and no paramount authority is given to one over the
other."); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (The Supreme Court held that
both are the "supreme law of the land" and "no superior efficacy is given to either over
the other.")
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 101, at § 115(a)(1).
[A]n act of Congress supersedes an earlier . . . provision of an international
agreement as the law of the United States. . .if the act and the earlier rule or
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
ception to the supremacy rule was set forth by the Supreme
Court as early as the nineteenth century11 ° when it held that "if
there be any conflict between the stipulations of the treaty and
the requirements of the law the latter must control.""' The Su-
preme Court has further held that "when a law is clear in its
provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts for
want of conformity to stipulations of a previous Treaty..."I"
The Supreme Court has stated that the court's duty is limited to
giving effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will."
3
Contrary to the domestic rule of law, the general rule of in-
ternational law is that the United States is not automatically re-
lieved of its international obligation or of the consequences of a
violation of that obligation by the mere enactment of a statute
that is contrary to the international obligation.1 4 A treaty is pri-
marily a contract between independent nations and it depends
on the parties for enforcement.1 15 If a party to a bilateral treaty
feels that the other party has violated the treaty, "it may pre-
sent its complaint to the executive head of the [other] govern-
ment, and take [any] measures as it may deem essential for the
protection of its interests.""' While the injured parties may seek
redress through international law avenues,"1 the courts within
the United States nevertheless remain bound by the domestic
law stated above." 8 Thus, while a court within the United States
must apply the domestic rule of law, and hold that the later in
time prevails, the United States remains bound by its interna-
tional obligation under the international rule of law.
provision cannot be fairly reconciled.
Id. See also Edye, 112 U.S. 580; Whitney, 124 U.S. 190; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581.
110. See Edye, 112 U.S. at 599; Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S.
at 600.
111. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. See also, Edye, 112 U.S. at 599; Chae Chan Ping,
130 U.S. at 600.
112. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
113. Id.
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 101, at § 115(b).
115. Edye, 112 U.S. at 598.
116. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
117. For example, one may demand that the offending party cease such activity and
if they refuse they may take the offending party to an international tribunal. L. HENKIN,
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 480-85
(2d ed. 1987).
118. Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question": A Response, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 524, 527 (1987). See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
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V. DISCUSSION
The court of appeals decision in MacNamara is absolutely
correct under the laws of the United States, although under the
international rule of law the district court's logic is also not
without some merit. The domestic rule of law is quite clear: in
the face of a conflict, the later in time prevails. The district
court would only be correct if it were a court of international
jurisdiction, which it is not.
When faced with a potential conflict between a statute and
a treaty, a United States court must first attempt to reconcile
them. There are three possible approaches to reconcile the FCN
Treaty with Title VII and the ADEA. The first approach looks
at the purpose behind the FCN Treaty, Title VII, and the
ADEA.11e The second approach deals with the difference be-
tween the term "nationality" and the term "citizen." 120 Since Ti-
tle VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality and
the FCN Treaty deals with conflicts based on citizenship, the
two may be reconciled. The final approach deals with the possi-
ble reconciliation under the terms of the BFOQ exemption of
Title VII. 121
A reconciliation between the FCN Treaty and the ADEA
may be possible in MacNamara, based on the different purposes
behind the FCN Treaty, Title VII, and the ADEA.122 As the
court of appeals stated in MacNamara, Title VII and the ADEA
were intended to prohibit intentional discrimination.1 23 The pur-
pose of the treaty exemption was not to permit Korean corpora-
tions to intentionally discriminate, but rather to assure Korean
corporations the right to have their businesses managed by their
own nationals within the host country.124 KAL intentionally set
out to replace its non-Korean managers with those who were
Korean, regardless of the non-Korean manager's ability to do
the job. 25 Thus, since KAL's act was an intentional act of dis-
119. See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
122. If the purposes of the statute and the treaty are not the same they may not be
in direct conflict and may be reconciled.
123. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141 (3d Cir. 1988). See also
Note, Title VII: Application of Impact Analysis to Subjective Employment Criteria -
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 264, 269 (1989).
124. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1144-45.
125. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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crimination, the treaty exception is inapplicable to the situation
in MacNamara. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the
purpose of Title VII and the ADEA was different than that of a
similar FCN treaty.126 The Supreme Court stated that the pur-
pose of an FCN Treaty, which contains a clause identical to Ar-
ticle VIII(l), was not to give foreign corporations greater rights
than domestic companies, but rather to guarantee them the op-
portunity to conduct business on an equal basis with domestic
companies without suffering discrimination based on national-
ity.12 7 FCN treaties were intended to promote hospitality and as-
sure foreign companies "equal protection of the laws alike with
the citizens of the [host] country.' 128 The circumstances sur-
rounding the enactment of the Treaty are a further indication of
its nondiscriminatory intent. When the Senate was considering
the FCN treaties, nine states had antidiscrimination statutes re-
garding employment,12 yet, during the testimony given on the
proposed FCN Treaty with the Republic of Korea, a State De-
partment representative testified that the Treaty contained
nothing that would affect the law of any state.130
Although these arguments have validity, a number of
counter-arguments may be offered. Since the Treaty seems on
its face to give corporations a broad right to hire executives of
their choice, an argument can be made that such a right should
include the right to intentionally discriminate in choosing such
executives. The Treaty seems to grant foreign corporations the
right to select executive personnel "of their choice" without any
regard to the underlying intent of such action.13' There is no
126. See supra note 77. In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982), the Supreme Court discussed the purpose of an FCN Treaty between the United
States and Japan. That treaty contains a clause identical to Article VIII(1) of the FCN
Treaty.
127. Id. at 187-88. See also Brief in opposition of Plaintiff-Respondent of Thomas v.
MacNamara at 7, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989) (No. 88-1449).
128. Walker, Treaties, supra note 25, at 230.
129. Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japa-
nese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947, 951 (1979). See also Cross-Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 8, MacNamara v.
Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989)
(No. 88-1449).
130. Sen. Ex. Rep. No. 5, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. July 1, 1956 (1957), at 13-14. See also
Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit at 8, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989) (No. 88-1449).
131. FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
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language which states, either expressly or impliedly, that such
selection of executive employees must be made in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner. Therefore, with regard to the argument that the
Treaty does not excuse the act of intentional discrimination, the
intent of KAL should be irrelevant in MacNamara, because the
Treaty does not appear to put any limits on the foreign corpora-
tion's right to engage executive employees of its choice.13 2
Under the second reconciliation approach, 3' it can be ar-
gued that the FCN Treaty does not include the same type of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII and the ADEA. For ex-
ample, the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of na-
tionality is not the same as the form of discrimination in this
case, which is on the basis of citizenship.134 This was the ap-
proach followed by the Wickes court.' The Wickes court held
that there was no conflict between a United States-Greek FCN
Treaty and Title VII because the Treaty permitted the hiring of
Greek citizens and Title VII does not proscribe discrimination
on the basis of one's citizenship.3 6 This theory, however, has no
basis in law. The term "nationality" is a term denoting a rela-
tionship between an individual and a nation involving a duty of
obedience or allegiance by the subject and protection by the
state. 37 Similarly, the term "citizen" is defined in the United
States as "[a person] born or naturalized in the United
States."'38 Assuming KAL fired MacNamara because he was a
citizen of the United States and not a Korean, the outcome
would be the same under both of these definitions. Because
MacNamara was naturalized within the United States, and was
a citizen of, and owed allegiance to that nation, instead of Ko-
rea, KAL chose to replace him with a Korean employee. 39 Such
an action or attitude is discriminatory under either definition,
and absent the Treaty, Title VII and the ADEA would unques-
tionably apply.
The third argument reconciling the FCN Treaty with Title
VII is that although KAL's actions were discriminatory, the ac-
132. FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
133. See MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1146-47.
134. See id.
135. Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
136. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 363.
137. Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1950).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
139. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1140 (3d Cir. 1988).
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tions fell under Title VII's BFOQ exception. 4 0 The BFOQ ex-
ception states that if a job can only be done by a particular type
of person, the employer may intentionally choose such an em-
ployee over another, even if such a selection is based on the race,
sex, or nationality of that party."4' The Avigliano court used this
approach, holding that there was no conflict between the FCN
Treaty and Title VII based on the BFOQ exception. 142 This ar-
gument is not persuasive in MacNamara, however, because
MacNamara was able to perform the duties of his position for a
number of years prior to his termination and the job had not
changed to merit the sudden need of a better qualified replace-
ment.' "43 Therefore, it appears that the BFOQ exception is inap-
plicable to this case.
If a reconciliation is not possible, the conflict remains.
Under the domestic law approach, the statutes will take prece-
dence over the FCN Treaty since the Treaty was ratified in 1956
and both Title VII, passed in 1964, and the ADEA, passed in
1967, were enacted after the Treaty.4 4 The court of appeals de-
cision that the antidiscrimination statutes prevail over the
Treaty because the statutes were the later in time is absolutely
correct under the law of the United States, which states that the
later in time will prevail.'45 Consequently, MacNamara should
have a valid claim under the antidiscrimination statutes and the
Treaty exemption is not a valid defense to MacNamara's claim.
Under international law, however, the Treaty may continue
to grant the exemption to KAL even though the courts of the
United States are obligated to apply the law consistently with
the domestic law stated above. 146 The district court seems to
have followed an approach that would be better placed in an
international court, which would be bound by the international
rule of law.147 The district court focused on the intent of Con-
gress to determine if Congress had expressly or impliedly dis-
avowed its treaty obligation by passing Title VII or the ADEA.
Disavowal of the treaty obligation would allow the statutes to
140. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
141. For definition of BFOQ, see supra note 64.
142. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
143. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1135-49.
144. See supra note 103.
145. See supra note 103.
146. See supra note 114.
147. W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 249-63 (1988).
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prevail under international law as well as under domestic law.148
Since Congress has the power to terminate or amend treaties,149
amendment or termination of the FCN Treaty through the en-
actment of Title VII or the ADEA would remove any United
States obligation under the Treaty. Since the district court
found no intent to amend or terminate the United States obliga-
tion under the FCN Treaty, it held that the United States re-
mains bound by the terms of the Treaty.5 0 Although this hold-
ing may be proper under the rules of international law, the
district court's holding was incorrect under the domestic laws of
the United States by which it is bound.1 51
Finally, there are three policy arguments regarding the con-
flict between the FCN Treaty and Title VII and the ADEA. The
first policy argument deals with the importance of complying
with the intent of the legislature when enacting either the FCN
Treaty or Title VII and the ADEA. The second policy argument
deals with the ramifications of the United States' nullifying an
international agreement on future foreign relations. The final
policy argument confronts the unfair advantage that a foreign
corporation would receive if it was not bound by the same an-
tidiscrimination statutes as domestic corporations.
It is important for courts to give full force and effect to the
intent of the parties to a treaty, as well as the intent of the legis-
lature in enacting the statutes. The Supreme Court has noted
that the court's role is limited to giving effect to the intent of
the parties to the Treaty.152 The primary purpose of Article
VIII(1) of the FCN Treaty was to ensure the right of foreign
corporations to employ their nationals if they so desired, thus
placing the foreign corporation on an equal footing with the do-
mestic companies. 53 Furthermore, the primary purpose of the
antidiscrimination statutes was to eliminate discriminatory and
preferential treatment, thus allowing equal employment oppor-
tunities to all employees. Therefore, to allow the foreign corpo-
rations to exercise their rights under the "of their choice" ex-
148. See supra note 101.
149. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 167-71 (1972) [hereinafter
HENKIN].
150. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1140 (3d Cir. 1988).
151. See supra note 118.
152. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982).
153. See Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,
50 AM. J. INT'L. L. 373, 386 (1956); see also Walker, Treaties, supra note 25, at 234.
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emption would in effect totally disregard the purpose of the
antidiscrimination statutes, giving foreign corporations greater
rights than those of domestic corporations.
If the United States does not abide by international agree-
ments and treaties, it will lose the trust of foreign nations. A
primary element that gives binding effect to international agree-
ments is the sincerity and credibility of the nations in agree-
ment.15 4 If a nation has a history of breaching international
agreements, other countries will not enter into agreements with
it. ' Therefore, if the United States passes a statute that con-
flicts with an existing international obligation, foreign nations
might not abide by existing agreements, nor might they enter
into future agreements.1 56 From a foreign affairs standpoint, it is
vital that the United States be trusted. On a strictly policy basis,
the international treaty should be recognized regardless of the
subsequent antidiscrimination statute.
Conversely, it may be argued that foreign corporations will
receive an unfair advantage if they are not bound by the antidis-
crimination statutes while domestic corporations remain bound
due to the cost associated with added regulation of corporate ac-
tivities. Granting preferential treatment to foreign corporations
under the FCN Treaty would undermine the intent of the FCN
Treaty as well as the statutes that were intended to promote
equality. There is a cost involved in abiding by and enforcing
the statutes, such as the limitation of managerial freedom, even
if the act will result in a more efficient and profitable corpora-
tion. If the foreign corporations are exempt, the domestic corpo-
rations may suddenly find it difficult to compete. Although for-
eign investment is certainly important to the United States
economy, the benefits afforded by the success of domestic corpo-
rations far outweigh the importance of foreign investment.
The purposes of the statutes and the Treaty were the same.
While the statute attempts to guarantee an equal chance to indi-
viduals who would otherwise be at a disadvantage in seeking a
particular position, the Treaty attempts to offer an equal chance
154. For reasons why nations observe international law, see L. Henkin, R. Pugh, 0.
Schachter & H. Smit, supra note 117, at 21 (citing L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE
(1979)).
155. Id.
156. As Professor Henkin observed, "Congress shows its disrespect for international
law by enacting statutes inconsistent with it." Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political
Question'" A Response, 101 HAv. L. REV. 524, 527 (1987).
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to foreign corporations who would otherwise be disadvantaged in
attempting to compete in a foreign marketplace. 157 Thus, to in-
terpret the statutes and the Treaty any other way would be con-
trary to their intended purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The decision of the court of appeals is correct under United
States law, and is consistent with the apparent intent of the
United States legislature. 158 Under international law, however,
the district court decision reaches the proper outcome.'59 In a
diplomatic sense, it is vital for the United States to abide by
international agreements. The enactment of statutes that con-
flict with such international agreements creates many problems
and should not be permitted to continue in the future. Although
several courts of appeal have reached different outcomes when
faced with the conflict between the FCN treaties and Title VII
and the ADEA,6 0 the United States Supreme Court has refused
to set a uniform rule or procedure for all courts. Congress has
failed to correct the conflict by amending either the Treaty or
the statutes. It is unfair that some foreign corporations have
been bound by the antidiscrimination statutes while others have
not, depending on the jurisdiction in which the action was
brought.
Since the Supreme Court does not seem willing to set a uni-
form procedure for dealing with such conflicts, it is up to the
legislature to enact such a procedure. A statute should be passed
requiring an investigation and report by the State Department
prior to the enactment of new statutes. This would confront
foreseeable conflicts between the proposed statute and current
international obligations. If the State Department finds such a
conflict, the statute should require either amendment of the in-
ternational obligation or amendment of the proposed statute in
order to alleviate such a conflict. Thereafter, upon a State De-
partment determination that the conflict no longer exists, the
new statute may be enacted. In the alternative, if Congress does
not wish to amend its international obligation or its proposed
statute, Congress should be required to expressly state its intent
157. HENKIN, supra note 149, at 168.
158. See supra notes 103, 156.
159. See supra notes 144-50.
160. See supra notes 72-84.
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in the newly enacted statute and how it wishes the courts to ap-
ply the statute in the face of a conflict.
With regard to the conflict between the FCN Treaty, Title
VII, and the ADEA, the Supreme Court's recent refusal to hear
this case has led to conflicting results in the circuit courts. Con-
gress should recognize the problem that this creates and deal
with it promptly. The laws of the United States are deemed to
be the law of the land and thus should be applied consistently
throughout the United States. Congress must not allow this con-
flict to be resolved differently from circuit to circuit. The statu-
tory nature of this problem makes this a legislative function
thus, this issue should not be left to the courts. Congress'
prompt action to set a uniform outcome to this issue will allevi-
ate future litigation with differing outcomes. Legislative action
will enable the courts to uniformly apply a federal rule.
Andrew J. Lauer
